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I. INTRODUCTION-SCOPE OF ARTICLE
LTHOUGH this article includes developments in the bank-
ruptcy courts, the author has attempted to limit the reported
cases to those involving state law' or other developments that
directly impact enforcement of the debtor-creditor relationship.2 This is
not intended to be an exhaustive survey of bankruptcy developments, but
rather an update regarding cases of interest to the Texas-based debtor-
creditor practitioner.3
In recent years, many developments in the bankruptcy courts have
arisen out of consumer cases. This year was no exception, so this article
devotes a section to developments in Chapter 13 practice. Many of these
cases deal more with Bankruptcy Code issues than Texas law; however,
familiarity with Chapter 13 practice is ever more crucial to any debtor-
creditor practitioner.
II. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
A. BANKRUPTCY CODE AND OTHER FEDERAL STATUTES
1. Bankruptcy Reform
During the 2000 legislative session, so called bankruptcy reform legisla-
tion remained an issue. Despite versions having passed both the House
and the Senate in late 1999, no final legislation emerged from either
house until the last hours of the 2000 session. The Senate passed the con-
1. Eg. homesteads, exemptions, etc.
2. Eg. dischargeability, automatic stay, etc.
3. Judge Lief Clark provides an extensive and thorough analysis of bankruptcy devel-
opments in the Fifth Circuit in the Fifth Circuit Symposium published annually by the
Texas Tech Law Review. See L. Clark, Bankruptcy, Fifth Circuit Symposium, 31 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 405 (2000); 30 TEX. TECH L. REV. 441(1999); 29 TEX. TECH L. REV. 355 (1998); 28
TEX. TECH L. REV. 299 (1997) D. Pawlowic, Banking Law, Fifth Circuit Symposium, 31
TEX. TECH L. REV. 385; 30 TEX. TECH L. REV. 425 (1999). For other, broader surveys that
focus exclusively on bankruptcy law developments, see J. Westbrook & E. Warren, Recent
Developments, University of Texas School of Law Bankruptcy Conference (2000); G. Pron-
ske, Recent Developments, State Bar of Texas Advanced Business Bankruptcy Course
(2000); B. Schermer, Recent Bankruptcy Cases You Need to Know About, Texas Tech Farm,
Ranch & Agribusiness Bankruptcy Course (2000).
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ference version of the bill, but it faced a White House veto. It is pure
speculation at this point, but the reader should assume that substantial
revisions to the Bankruptcy Code may have been passed by the time this
Survey is published; however, one would hope that the "reform" ulti-
mately passed will be in a more workable version than the current bill.
B. STATE LAw-HOME EQUITY LOANS
There was no legislative session during the Survey period, so there are
no Texas legislative developments to report. That said, readers should be
on the lookout for possible revisions to the home equity laws in light of
the Texas Supreme Court's holding in Stringer v. Cendant Mortgage
Corp.,4 which is discussed elsewhere in this Survey.
III. BANKRUPTCY CASES
A. SUPREME COURT DEVELOPMENTS
1. State Law Governs Establishment of Bankruptcy Claims
In Raleigh v. Illinois Department of Revenue,5 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed this issue: "[W]ho bears the burden of proof on a tax claim in
bankruptcy court when the substantive law creating the tax obligation
puts the burden on the taxpayer (in this case, the trustee in bank-
ruptcy)."' 6 In other words, does underlying substantive (typically, state)
law govern the establishment of a claim, or is there special treatment to
be afforded certain claims (i.e., tax claims) in bankruptcy?
The basic facts are that the president of a defunct company was alleged
to be liable for an unpaid tax claim as a responsible controlled person.
Under Illinois law, the burden of proof in a challenge to such a claim lies
with the taxpayer. In this case, the individual taxpayer's bankruptcy trus-
tee assumed the position of the taxpayer and urged for a variety of rea-
sons analyzed by the court and summarized below, that the burden of
proof should have been borne by the taxing entity. There was apparently
a split among the circuit courts on this issue, and critically, the Fifth Cir-
cuit had previously held that in a bankruptcy context, the burden should
shift to the tax entity.7
In upholding the underlying state law, the court started with this basic
proposition: "[c]reditors' entitlements in bankruptcy arise in the first in-
stance from the underlying substantive law creating the debtor's obliga-
tion, subject to any qualifying or contrary provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code."'8 In citing numerous prior Supreme Court cases, the Court contin-
ued, "the 'basic federal rule' in bankruptcy is that state law governs the
4. 23 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. 2000) (notice requirements regarding use of home equity pro-
ceeds to pay third party creditors).
5. 530 U.S. 15 (2000).
6. Id. at 16.
7. See In re Placid Oil Co., 988 F.2d 554, 557 (5th Cir. 1993).
8. Raleigh, 530 U.S. at 20.
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substance of claims [citation omitted] Congress having 'generally left the
determination of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt's estate to
state law."9 Given that guiding principle, what role does the burden of
proof play in the substantive establishment of a claim? According to the
Court, "given its importance to the outcome of cases, we have long held
the burden of proof to be a 'substantive' aspect of a claim." 10 Critically,
the Court added, "tax law is no candidate for exception from this general
rule. ....- 11 Regarding the burden of proof, the court also noted that the
bankruptcy court establishes certain burdens of proof in particular situa-
tions, such as seeking relief from the automatic stay, and other unique
procedural settings.' 2
The absence of any special burden of proof regarding tax claims in the
bankruptcy court indicated that Congress intended that this issue be left
to substantive law. With the burden of proof having been found to consti-
tute a part of the underlying substantive claim, there was no statutory
basis for shifting that burden, and the Supreme Court likewise refused to
invoke equitable remedies such as "equitable subordination"' 3 to vary
from the plain meaning of the Code.
Thus, the finding of Raleigh is a reiteration that underlying substantive
law governs the establishment of a valid claim, with the burden of proof a
substantive part of that claim. There is no special treatment for tax
claims, which would indicate that the prior Fifth Circuit ruling in Placid
Oil14 is effectively overruled.
2. Standing to Surcharge Collateral
In Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A.," 5
an administrative claimant in a Chapter 11 case, which was subsequently
converted to a Chapter 7, sought to surcharge a secured creditor's collat-
eral to recover its administrative claim. In essence, the issue before the
Supreme Court was whether a non-trustee party had standing to assert
this right, which arises out of section 506(c). That section allows the trus-
tee to surcharge certain collateral for the "reasonable, necessary costs
9. Id. (citing Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979)). "Unless some federal
interest requires a different result, there is no reason why [the state] interests should be
analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy
proceeding."
Id. (citing Butner, 440 U.S. at 55).
10. Raleigh v. I11. Dep't of Revenue, 530 U.S. 11, 20 (2000). "That is, the burden of
proof is an essential element of the claim itself; one who asserts a claim is entitled to the
burden of proof that comes with it." Id.
11. Id. The Court also discussed the various rationales for imposing the burden of
proof on the taxpayer. Id.
12. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362(g) (allocation of burden of proof on certain issues upon
filing of a motion for relief from the automatic stay). See also discussion in Raleigh, 530
U.S. at 19.
13. Raleigh, 530 U.S. at 20 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (equitable subordination of
claims among various creditors)).
14. In re Placid Oil Co., 988 F.2d at 557.
15. 530 U.S. 1 (2000).
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and expenses of preserving, or disposing of such property .... ,,16 The
Court concluded that the administrative claimant lacked such standing.
The Court was required to construe the express terms of the statute,
which empowered a specific party (the trustee) to exercise this right. Ad-
ditionally, the trustee's unique role in bankruptcy administration but-
tressed the apparent exclusivity found in the plain language of the
statute.17 It was not specifically addressed in the statute, but in a Chapter
11, the debtor is typically empowered with the duties and responsibilities
of a "debtor in possession," which is analogous to a trustee.18 That was
not the issue in this case, because the party seeking to surcharge the col-
lateral was an administrative claimant, and not the debtor or debtor in
possession. The debtor in possession's avoidance powers, however, come
from a specific provision in the Bankruptcy Code, which the administra-
tive claimant in Union Planters Bank lacked.
B. HOMESTEADS AND EXEMPTIONS
1. Use of Proceeds of Non-Exempt Property
The Texas Property Code denies an exemption claim in personal prop-
erty acquired with the proceeds of non-exempt property, when accom-
plished with the intent to defraud, delay, or hinder a creditor;19 however,
Texas statutory law is silent when those proceeds are used to acquire or
pay for an interest in the debtor's homestead (i.e., real property).
This was put to the test in In re Coates,20 in which the debtors partici-
pated in a variety of ill conceived actions pre-petition. In short, when
faced with impending financial difficulties, the debtors first transferred,
for no consideration, a promissory note and some non-exempt real estate
to their accountant. Later, the note was sold for $80,00021 and those pro-
ceeds were deposited in the debtors' bank account. Ultimately, the debt-
ors made a number of disbursements from those funds, including paying
off liens against two vehicles and paying off the mortgage against their
home. The debtors were also apparently receiving legal counseling from
one or more lawyers over the course of these transactions.
16. 11 U.S.C. § 506(c). The trustee may recover from property securing an allowed
secured claim the reasonable, necessary costs and expenses of preserving, or disposing of,
such property to the extent of any benefit to the holder of such claim. Id.
17. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. at 6. The Court observed:
First, a situation in which a statute authorizes specific action and designates a
particular party empowered to take it is surely among the least appropriate
in which to presume non-exclusivity... Second, the fact that the sole party
named-the trustee-has a unique role in bankruptcy proceedings makes it
entirely plausible that Congress would provide a power to him and not to
others.
18. Id. at 7. 11 U.S.C. § 1107 ("subject to... limitations.., debtor in possession shall
have all the rights ... powers ... functions and duties ... of a trustee serving in a case
under this chapter").
19. TEX. PROP. CODE § 42.004(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
20. 242 B.R. 901 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000).
21. From the opinion, it appears that the note was transferred to one of the payees.
There were no details given of that transaction. Id. at 904 n.4.
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The debtors filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy, which was also fraught with
problems. Initially, they omitted a number of transactions from their
statement of financial affairs, and most importantly, they did not mention
the transfer of the note for the $80,000. The Chapter 7 trustee objected to
their exemption claims as to the two motor vehicles and homestead, liens
against which were paid off with a portion of the note proceeds.
With respect to the subject matter generally, the court acknowledged
legislative history prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in
which these types of transfers were not necessarily disfavored.22 The
court noted, however, that the Bankruptcy Code was ultimately enacted
with no specific provision in place. With the debtors claiming under the
state exemption scheme, however, the court acknowledged the more re-
strictive approach when there are state law provisions denying exemp-
tions because of fraudulent conduct. 23 This was ultimately dispositive in
Coates.
Specifically, the court found that in light of the specific Texas Property
Code prohibition, the personal property exemption claims were denied to
the extent of the pre-petition payments, and the trustee was awarded a
lien against those two vehicles in the amounts paid.24
Under Texas law, however, there was no statutory counterpart regard-
ing the homestead. Although a homestead claim could be set aside when
the homestead was acquired with "the fruits of a fraud," simply using
non-exempt proceeds to pay off a homestead lien was not subject to the
same prohibition. Therefore, the homestead claim was allowed. 25
2. Exemptions Denied for Constantly Amending Schedules
In In re Park,26 Judge Donald Sharp denied all exemptions claimed by
a debtor who had apparently amended his schedules numerous times
throughout the development of his Chapter 7 proceeding. Most of the
schedule amendments involved his schedule C exemption claims, which
started out reflecting only his homestead. As of the date of his creditors'
meeting, the debtor amended his schedules to reflect the homestead and
a substantial amount of personal property. The schedules were also
amended numerous times after that,27 including a fourth and fifth
22. Id. at 905.
23. Id.
24. The trustee was effectively surrogated to the interests of the prior lienholders. Id.
at 906 (citing § TEX. PROP. CODE § 42.004(a)).
25. Id. at 906-07. The court relied, in part, on In re Reed, 700 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983),
which originally arose in the same bankruptcy court. Judge Akard mentioned that at the
trial court level, his predecessor denied that debtor's discharge for engaging in similar acts,
including selling substantial non-exempt assets and using proceeds to pay down homestead
liens. The Coates opinion does not mention anything about whether the discharge of these
debtors was challenged.
26. 246 B.R. 837 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2000).
27. See id. 839-40.
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amended set of schedules after a trial.28
Generally, exemption claims are liberally allowed, as are good faith
amendments to a debtor's schedules.2 9 Even the mere presence of numer-
ous amendments alone will not necessarily limit a debtor's exemption
claims. 30 That said, a debtor nevertheless had "a positive duty to disclose
for the benefit of one's creditors all of one's interest in property rights...
the obligation is strict and the law requires such schedules to be complete
and accurate as possible. ' 31 This duty has been described as "para-
mount," and a debtor's failure to meet this obligation strikes "at the heart
of the bankruptcy system."'32
In Park, the court could not find any level of accuracy or truth to the
debtor's schedules, which appeared "as a constantly shifting landscape. '33
The court therefore concluded that the debtor's non-compliance with the
Bankruptcy Code's mandated disclosure requirement could only result in
disallowance of the debtor's exemption claims.34 Additionally, because
of related non-disclosure applicable to other assets of the debtor, the
debtor's discharge was also revoked.35
C. AUTOMATIC STAY AND ADEQUATE PROTECTION
1. Time for Filing Complaint
In In re Dunlap,3 6 the Fifth Circuit revisited the issue of the timeliness
of the filing of a complaint to determine dischargeability, which must be
filed within sixty days following the date first set for the Section 341
meeting of creditors. The unique twist in Dunlap was provided by the
dismissal and subsequent reinstatement of the case. 37 After reinstate-
ment, a new date for the first meeting of creditors was set, along with a
corresponding bar date for non-dischargeability complaints. Additionally,
28. Id. In a footnote, the court also concluded that the last amendments fell under the
restrictions applicable to amendment of pleadings as governed by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Id. at 840 n.3.
29. See generally In re Stone, 10 F.3d 285, 291 (5th Cir. 1994 ) (noting that late amend-
ment to schedules is allowed after inadvertent omissions). But see In re Smith, 21 F.3d 660,
663-64 (5th Cir. 1994) (applying Stone factors, omission was not inadvertent, creditor was
prejudiced, etc.-amendment not allowed and claim of creditor omitted from mailing ma-
trix was not discharged).
30. See Park, 246 B.R. at 841 n.9 (citing In re Fournier, 169 B.R. 282 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1994) (noting that amended exemption claims are generally allowed absent bad faith, con-
cealment, or prejudice to creditors)).
31. In re Park, 246 B.R. 837, 841-42 (Bankr.E.D. Tex. 2000).
32. Id. at 842 (citing In re Mohring, 142 B.R. 389, 394 (Bankr. E.D. Ca. 1992)).
33. Park, 246 B.R. at 841.
34. Id. at 844. The court also noted that untimely filed schedules may waive a debtor's
exemption claim unless the untimely filing is permitted by the bankruptcy court, which is
typically granted under a fairly liberal standard. Id. at 844 n.15.
35. Id. at 839 n.2.
36. 217 F.3d. 311 (5th Cir. 2000).
37. The debtor filed a motion to dismiss, and the court entered an order without a
hearing. The court subsequently reinstated the case and directed the debtor to reset his
motion to dismiss for a hearing. Because of a clerical error, the order vacating the dismissal
was not entered until three months after the dismissal.
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the debtor purportedly rescheduled the first meeting and issued a notice
to that effect. Both dates were docketed by the Bankruptcy Court, but no
formal notice was provided.
Two creditors filed complaints to determine dischargeability well after
what would have been the bar date following the date first set for the first
scheduled meeting, but within the time set by the clerk following the rein-
statement.38 The issue before the Fifth Circuit, however, was how to de-
termine the bar date for filing a non-dischargeability complaint after a
bankruptcy court has dismissed, and then reinstated, the case. The court
declined to impose any kind of equitable tolling rule; however, the court
found that the reinstatement and the clerk's re-setting of the Section 341
meeting was effectively the new "first date set," and therefore, the bar
date ran sixty days following that new "first date."' 39 The court acknowl-
edged that a tolling rule would avoid the need for prophylactic or pre-
ventative filings, but at the expense of the certainty provided by the fixed
sixty day filing period. Therefore, the holding of this case is most likely
limited to the unusual circumstance of a new "first date" after a dismissal
and reinstatement.40
2. Standing to File a Dischargeability Complaint
In In re Davis,4 1 the Fifth Circuit addressed whether the personal rep-
resentative of a decedent's estate had standing to file a non-dis-
chargeability complaint. Under state law, the plaintiff administrator was
the only person under the Texas Wrongful Death statute to bring a state
court action, because none of the children or parents of the deceased (the
real parties in interest) filed within the three month period provided
under state law.42
After the debtor's Chapter 7 filing, the administrator filed a complaint
to determine the dischargeability of certain debts owing the wrongful
death beneficiaries. 43 The debtor filed a motion for summary judgment,
alleging that the administrator lacked standing to bring the complaint,
arguing that the personal representative was not a "creditor to whom
payment is owed"44 because she was not the real party to whom any such
claim would ultimately be payable.
The district court withdrew the bankruptcy reference and the district
court subsequently granted the debtor a summary judgment on this issue.
The Fifth Circuit reversed, however, finding that as a personal represen-
38. One complaint was filed March 31, 1998, and the other on April 2, 1998. Id.
39. Id. at 317.
40. Id.
41. 194 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 1999).
42. Texas law provides that a wrongful death action is for the exclusive benefit of the
surviving spouse, children, and parents of the deceased; however, if none of those individu-
als file suit within three months, the personal representative of the decedent's estate is
required to file the action. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.004 (Vernon 1997).
43. The action was based on the debtor's alleged willful and malicious acts under sec-
tion 523(a)(6).
44. Davis, 194 F.3d at 573; see also 11 U.S.C. § 523(c)(1).
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tative of the deceased, she had effectively been granted a claim and the
right to payment against the debtor under state law. Therefore, even
though she was acting in a representative capacity, the administrator was
a creditor with standing to object to the dischargeability of the wrongful
death claim.45
3. Credit Card Debt
At least three cases during the Survey period rejected attempts by
credit card companies to have credit incurred following pre-approved
credit solicitations declared non-dischargeable. In In re Mercer,46 the
Fifth Circuit found that a debtor who had received a pre-approved credit
card did not commit the elements of fraud necessary to establish non-
dischargeability. Not only could the lender not establish the basic ele-
ments of fraud,47 the lender was likewise unable to establish its own "jus-
tifiable reliance" on any representations made by the debtor.48
While the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the creditor does not have a
duty to investigate the debtor to show justifiable reliance, the court con-
cluded that in accepting an unsolicited, pre-approved credit card, the
debtor essentially made no representation at all. 49 Most importantly for
Texas practitioners, the court noted that to find a fraudulent misrepresen-
tation by the debtor in this context, the Fifth Circuit would have to apply
the so-called "implied representation theory" to this scenario, which the
court declined to do.50
45. Id. at 574. The opinion provided a lengthy analysis of persons and entities that in
their representative capacity, had standing to assert a claim or cause of action, although not
the person ultimately entitled to payment. Accordingly, the persons or entities with "statu-
tory authority to prosecute and collect a claim against the debtor, even if other persons are
entitled to ultimate payment on the claim" are creditors under the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at
576-77. See, e.g., Nathanson v. Nat'l Labor Relations Board, 344 U.S. 25, 27 (holding that
NLRB is the public agent to enforce the National Labor Relations Act); Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Kane, 212 B.R. 697, 700 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (holding that the
SEC can bring actions to have securities fraud claims declared non-dischargeable); In re
Taibbi, 213 B.R. 261, 267 (Bankr. E.D. NY 1997) (holding that county consumer protection
agency had standing to sue). Under Texas law, the personal representative of the dece-
dent's estate has exclusive standing, after three months, to prosecute wrongful death
claims, even though the statutorily defined persons outlined in footnote 42 are the ultimate
beneficiaries of those claims. TEX. Civ. PR~c. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.004 (Vernon 1997).
46. 211 F.3d 214 (5th Cir. 2000).
47. Id. at 216.
In order for a debtor's representation to be a false representation or a pre-
tense, a creditor must show that the debtor (1) made a knowing and fraudu-
lent falsehood; (2) describing past or current facts; (3) that was relied upon
by the creditor; (4) who thereby suffered a loss. [citation omitted]. The credi-
tor must show that it actually and justifiably relied upon the debtor's
representations.
Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 69-70 (1995) (citations omitted).
48. Mercer, 211 F.3d at 216-17.
49. Id. at 217.
50. Id. at 218. Under the implied representation theory, the credit card holder pur-
portedly makes a representation that he or she intends to pay each time he incurs a debt,
much like the representation that money received as a cash advance from an ATM implies
a promise to repay that money. L.A. Capital Fed. Credit Union v. Melancon, 223 B.R. 300,
311 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1998). Again, the Fifth Circuit declined to apply this principle, stat-
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Judge Barbara Houser reached a similar result in In re Kuntz51 and In
re Rich,52 in which the court provided an in depth, fact intensive analyses
of yet two more unsolicited credit card scenarios. 53 Like the Fifth Circuit,
the court declined to apply the implied representation theory, concluding
"that use of a credit card to incur debt does not necessarily involve a
representation as a matter of fact or law."'54 The court provides additional
analysis of the use of the implied representation theory, even noting di-
vergent views on that theory found in the various concurring opinions in
In re Mercer.55
Kuntz is important because it provides additional analysis regarding the
debtor's intent to deceive the lender, specifically whether a debtor's
hopeless insolvency may give rise to an inference of fraudulent intent.56
In short, the court applied a "totality of the circumstances test,"'57 and
found that the debtor's hopeless insolvency did satisfy the intent require-
ment of section 523(a)(2)(A). That said, the court nevertheless concluded
that the lender did not reasonably rely on any representations by the
debtor, and found the debt dischargeable. 58
In a case tried prior to Kuntz, which resulted in an opinion issued the
same day as Kuntz, Judge Houser reached a similar conclusion. In In re
Rich,59 the same creditor attempted to have another pre-approved credit
ing "We conclude that we should apply a rule that favors the debtor, at least in the pre-
approved cared card context, and we decline to apply the implied representation theory."
Mercer, 211 F.3d at 218.
51. 249 B.R. 699 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000).
52. 249 B.R. 709 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000).
53. The court narrowed the case to five issues:
1. Whether the debtor made a false representation to the lender;
2. Whether the debtor made representations with the intent to deceive;
3. Whether the lender actually and justifiably relied on any
misrepresentation;
4. Whether the lender was substantially justified in filing the adversary pro-
ceeding; and
5. Whether certain special circumstances exist to make an award of cost and
reasonable attorneys' fees unjust.
Kuntz, 249 B.R. at 701.
54. Id. at 704 (following In re Alvie, 191 B.R. 724 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996)).
55. See id. at 704 n.5.
56. Id. at 706 (citing In re Boydston, 520 F.2d 1098, 1101 (5th Cir. 1975)).
57. The factors identified by the court include:
1. The length of time between the charges made and the bankruptcy filing;
2. Whether an attorney was consulted about bankruptcy before the charges
were incurred;
3. The number and amount of charges and sudden changes in the debtor's
buying habits;
4. The debtor's financial condition and whether debtor was employed;
5. Whether the charges exceeded the credit limit;
6. Whether multiple charges were made on the same day;
7. Debtor's financial sophistication; and
8. Whether purchases were for luxuries.
Kuntz, 249 B.R. at 706-07.
58. Id. at 708. The court noted the creditor's reliance on what is commonly known in
the industry as the FICO score (Fair Isaac Company methodology) to evaluate potential
and existing cardholders. Id. at 708, 702.
59. 249 B.R. 709 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000).
1150 [Vol. 54
BANKRUPTCY AND CREDITORS' RIGHTS
card debt declared non-dischargeable. The facts were somewhat similar
to those in Mercer and Kuntz, so they will not be recited here. Like
Kuntz, however, Rich is must read for any creditor whose claim is based
on a pre-approved credit card. In addition to the rejection of the implied
representation theory, Kuntz and Rich are both important because Judge
Houser found that even recognizing the split of authority on the implied
representation theory, the lender failed to meet its burden of proof re-
garding the reliance element. Therefore, it was not substantially justified
in filing either adversary proceeding, and the debtors were awarded their
attorneys' fees in defending the proceedings.60
4. Conversion of Collateral
In In re Grisham,61 Judge Stephen Felsenthal addressed the classic is-
sue of whether the unauthorized sale of collateral could give rise to a
non-dischargeable claim. In Grisham, two partners, who ultimately be-
came Chapter 7 debtors, operated a partnership that owned and grazed
cattle. They had a long term relationship with their lender; however, in
the final year of that relationship, the bank alleged that a substantial por-
tion of their cattle herd had been sold without the bank's knowledge or
consent. The individuals, along with their spouses, ultimately filed for
Chapter 7 protection.
The creditor whose claim had been secured by the cattle filed an adver-
sary proceeding to determine dischargeability under three subsections of
Section 523(a), alleging common fraud,62 fraud, or defalcation in a fiduci-
ary capacity, 63 and willful and malicious injury.64 The court easily dis-
missed the common fraud and fiduciary fraud allegations, finding,
respectively, that there was no misrepresentation at the time of the last
renewal of the loan,65 and that there was no express or implied trust
relationship. 66
With those claims dismissed, the court addressed willful and malicious
injury. To find the unauthorized sale of collateral non-dischargeable, the
court would have to find that the injury was willful, or in other words "a
deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act
that leads to injury."' 67 In that regard, the creditor must establish "either
an objective certainty of harm or a subjective motive to cause harm. '68
Finally, assuming the injury was committed willfully, the injury must also
60. Kuntz, 249 B.R. at 709; Rich, 249 B.R. at 720.
61. 245 B.R. 65 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000).
62. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).
63. Id. § 523(a)(4).
64. Id. § 523(a)(6).
65. In a fraud context, the critical time of injury is the time of the loan or renewal, not
the debtor's subsequent conduct.
66. The court found that there was no express or implied trust relationship arising out
of the security agreement or the bank's status as a secured creditor. Grisham, 245 B.R. at
71.
67. Id. at 71 (citing Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998)).
68. Id. (citing In re Miller, 156 F.3d 598, 603 (5th Cir. 1998)).
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be "malicious," that is, "without just cause or excuse."' 69 In sum, the court
framed the issue as whether the debtors deliberately or intentionally in-
jured the bank in unauthorized collateral sales, and if so, whether the
debtors had cause or excuse for their actions.
After a fact intensive inquiry, the court concluded that a substantial
portion of the bank's collateral (cattle) had been sold without the bank's
knowledge or consent. Although the debtors paid down interest on the
note, no principal reductions were made following the cattle sales. The
debtors argued that proceeds were placed in their account with the bank;
however, the court concluded that any such deposits, if made, fell far
short of principal reduction or even replenishment of the bank's collat-
eral.70 Finding no express authorization for the cattle sales, and given the
debtors' failure to account for the disposition of a substantial amount of
the proceeds, the court found a willful and malicious injury, rendering the
claim non-dischargeable.
Notably, in addition to the section 523 complaint, the bank took the
somewhat unusual step of pressing a complaint under section 727(a)(2),
which denies a discharge to a debtor who within one year before filing,
transfers property with an intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.
Because of the debtor's failure to account for a substantial amount of the
proceeds, the court found that the unauthorized cattle sales not only
amounted to a non-dischargeable willful and malicious injury, but also
hindered the bank in a Section 727 context. Accordingly, the individual
debtors who were principals of the cattle company were denied their
discharge.71
D. CHAPTER 13 PRACTICE
1. Wholly Unsecured Claims Against Debtor's Residence
It is axiomatic that a claim secured by a lien against the debtor's princi-
pal residence cannot be modified in a Chapter 13 plan. This so-called
anti-modification provision is codified at section 1322(b) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, 72 and the typical practice is that any payment arrearage is
cured in the plan, but the debtor stays current on post-petition payments
coming due under the mortgage.
69. In re Grisham, 245 B.R. 65, 71 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000) (citing In re Garner, 56
F.3d 677, 681 (5th Cir. 1995)).
70. "They have not accounted for the remainder and yet did not use the remainder to
replenish the collateral or pay the principal of the note." Id. at 73-74.
71. Id. at 74-75. The Section 727 claim, however, was dismissed as to the spouses.
72. The section reads in pertinent part:
(b) Subject to subsections (a) and (c) of this section, the plan may -
(2) modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured
only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal resi-
dence, or of holders of unsecured claims, or leave unaffected the rights of
holders of any class of claims;
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (emphasis added).
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This principle typically applies to creditors whose claims are fully or
partially secured by the debtor's residence. 73 What happens, however,
when the claim is secured by the residence, but there is no equity or value
for that creditor's claim? In In re Bartee,7 4 the Fifth Circuit held that such
a claim is essentially unsecured. Because of its unsecured nature, the anti-
modification clause would not apply.
In Bartee, the creditor was a homeowner's association with an inferior
lien against the residence arising out of unpaid homeowner's association
dues, and its lien was inferior to a prior lien that was equal to or greater
than the value of the underlying real property. The Fifth Circuit began its
analysis under Section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which defined se-
cured and unsecured liens.75 Recognizing an apparent split in authority
on the applicability of the anti-modification provision to wholly un-
secured claims,76 the court found that under a classic Bankruptcy Code
analysis, the claim is essentially unsecured, and therefore the anti-modifi-
cation provision would not apply.
The debtor advanced a second argument under a relatively narrow ex-
ception to the anti-modification provision. In section 1322(c)(2), certain
short term debts secured by the residence are excluded from the anti-
modification provision. 77 The court easily rejected that claim, because
the nature of the property assessment was not the kind of claim contem-
plated by the statute, which was designed to address short term contrac-
tual payment obligations that matured before the final plan payment
date.78
2. Discrimination in Treatment of Co-Signed Debts
During the Survey period, the Fifth Circuit twice rejected attempts by
Chapter 13 debtors to provide for extremely favorable treatment of co-
signed debts in their Chapter 13 plans. The debtors in In re Chacon79
attempted to confirm a plan providing that a debt cosigned by the
debtor's father would have priority over all other unsecured claims. Its
effect would have been that the cosigned debt would be paid in full, with
a high rate of interest, before other claims could be paid. Again recogniz-
ing a split in authority,80 the court found that the prohibition against un-
73. See Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. (1993).
74. 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000).
75. 11 U.S.C. § 506 (regarding the determination of secured status).
76. Compare In re McDonald, 205 F.3d 606 (3rd Cir. 2000) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36
(9th Cir. BAP 1997) with In re Perry, 235 B.R. 603 (S.D. Tex. 1999) and Am. Gen. Fin., Inc.
v. Dickerson, 229 B.R. 539 (M.D. Ga. 1999).
77. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(2) (noting that when the last contract payment is due
before the final payment date under the plan, the plan may allow modification).
78. Bartee, 212 F.3d at 295-96. This conclusion was consistent with a number of bank-
ruptcy court cases cited by the Fifth Circuit. See Perry, 235 B.R. at 608-09. See also In re
Bagne, 219 B.R. 272, 273 (Bankr. E.D. Ca. 1998); In re Eubanks, 219 B.R. 468, 473-77 (6th
Cir. BAP 1998).
79. 202 F.3d 725 (5th Cir. 1999).
80. Compare In re Easley, 72 B.R. 948, 955-56 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1987) with In re
Dornon, 103 B.R. 61, 64 (Bankr. N.D. NY 1989).
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fair discrimination found in the statute would apply to a Chapter 13
plan. 81 Even recognizing that "differences in treatment are not discrimi-
natory if they rationally further a legitimate interest of the debtor and do
not disproportionately benefit the cosigner," the court found that a pro-
posal to pay the cosigned debt in full, with interest, before any distribu-
tions whatsoever rose to the level of unfair discrimination. 82
The same court reached a similar conclusion in In re Ramirez,83 which
likewise proposed to pay a cosigned debt in full, with 12% interest,
before distribution to unsecured creditors. The pertinent facts were es-
sentially identical with the Chacon case, so the court simply cited Chacon
and affirmed a bankruptcy court order denying confirmation of that
plan.84
3. Property of the Estate-Pre-Conversion Wages
Another practical reality of Chapter 13 cases is that many wind up con-
verted to cases under Chapter 7. In In re Stamm,85 the Fifth Circuit ad-
dressed the practical quandary of what happens to the debtor's wages (a
portion of which has presumably been paid over to the Chapter 13 trus-
tee) upon conversion? The Fifth Circuit found that monies paid over
from the debtor's wages to the Chapter 13 trustee that are subsequently
distributed to the Chapter 7 trustee were not part of the Chapter 7 estate.
According to the Fifth Circuit, this question was resolved by the 1994
Property Code amendments, which specifically provided that upon con-
version from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7, property of the estate consists of
"the property of the estate, as of the date of filing of the petition, that re-
mains in the possession of or is under the control of the debtor on the
date of conversion. '86 In other words, wages that were earned after the
filing of the Chapter 13 do not fall within that statutory definition and
therefore are not property of the estate upon conversion. 87
4. Chapter 13 Debtor's Standing to Assert Avoidance Actions
In In re Stangel,88 the debtor filed an adversary proceeding against the
81. As quoted in the opinion, the statute allows a plan to "designate a class or classes
of unsecured claims ... but may not discriminate unfairly against any class so designated;
however, such plan may treat claims for a consumer debt of the debtor if an individual is
liable on such consumer debt with the debtor differently than other unsecured claims." 11
U.S.C. §1322(b)(1). Id. at 726.
82. Id. at 726-27.
83. 204 F.3d 595 (5th Cir. 2000).
84. Id. at 596. In Ramirez, Judge Benavides authored a concurring opinion, expressing
somewhat different reasoning than the analysis that was stated in the Chacon case. Id. at
596-97 (Benavides, J. specially concurring).
85. 222 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2000).
86. Id. at 217 (emphasis added) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 348(f)(1)).
87. Id. at 217-18. According to the Fifth Circuit, the statutory amendment and this
holding should clarify some confusion that arose under prior versions of the statute and
prior opinions. Id. at 217 (citing In re Baker, 154 F.3d 534, 536 (5th Cir. 1998)); In re
Sandoval, 103 F.3d 20, 23 (5th Cir. 1997).
88. 219 F.3d 498 (5th Cir. 2000).
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Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") seeking to avoid an IRS tax lien. The
adversary proceeding was filed under section 545 of the Bankruptcy
Code, which empowers a trustee to avoid certain statutory liens on prop-
erty of the debtor. The Fifth Circuit found that the debtor had no stand-
ing because of the specific language of Section 545, which allocates this
avoidance power specifically to the trustee.89
This case should come as no surprise, because unlike a Chapter 11
debtor in possession, a Chapter 13 debtor is not analogous to a trustee,
which was noted in a different context in the Union Planters Bank case
discussed above. 90 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit had previously reached
a similar conclusion in deciding that a Chapter 13 debtor lacked the
avoidance powers under section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code.91 Thus, the
adversary proceeding was dismissed due to the debtor's lack of standing.
IV. BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE STATE COURTS
A. BANKRUPTCY IN STATE COURTS GENERALLY
The Survey period saw an unusual number of state court cases in which
the bankruptcy of one or more of the parties impacted the outcome of the
case. Some of those cases are discussed in more detail below.
A common thread that runs through many of the state court cases,
which differs slightly from holdings in the Fifth Circuit, is the state courts'
view of actions taken in violation of the automatic stay. The Fifth Circuit
has steadfastly held that actions taken in violation of the automatic stay
are voidable rather than void.92 The majority of Texas courts, however,
generally find actions taken in violation of the stay to be void.93 At least
one state court during the Survey period adhered to this view, acknowl-
edging the persuasive, but non-binding effect of the Fifth Circuit.94 That
same court, however, agreed with the Fifth Circuit that it is possible for a
bankruptcy court to retroactively annul a stay,95 but that same court ad-
hered to the more restricted view that termination or modification of the
stay (as opposed to annulment) does not retroactively validate actions
89. Id. at 500 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 545, which reads in part: "the trustee may avoid the
fixing of a statutory lien on property of the debtor..."). See also 11 U.S.C. § 545.
90. See Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1 (2000).
91. See In re Hamilton, 125 F.3d 292 (5th Cir. 1997). As discussed in Stangel, the Ham-
ilton court reasoned that a Chapter 13 debtor lacks standing to pursue a section 544 avoid-
ance; however, section 1303 allows the debtor certain specified rights of a trustee under
section 363. The Hamilton court did conclude, however, that the debtor's suit met the re-
quirements of section 522(h), which allows a debtor to avoid certain non-purchase money
liens on otherwise exempt property. Section 522(h), however, is a substantially different
type of avoidance power than that found under sections 544 or 545.
92. In re Jones, 63 F.3d 411, 412, (5th Cir. 1995) (actions in violation of the stay are
voidable because the court has the power to annul the stay retroactively); Sikes v. Global
Marine, Inc., 881 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir. 1989).
93. E.g., Howell v. Thompson, 839 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. 1992).
94. In re Sensitive Care, Inc., 28 S.W.3d 35, 39 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 2000, no pet. h.).
95. Id. at 39 (citing Goswami v. Metro. S&L Ass'n, 751 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Tex. 1988)).
See also Jones, 63 F.3d at 412.
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taken in violation of it.96
B. EFFECT OF DISCHARGE ON PENDING STATE COURT CLAIM
At least two courts struggled with the concept of what constituted a
claim, which would have been discharged in bankruptcy. In Glass v.
Prcin,97 a plaintiff brought suit for damages arising out of the purchase of
a house. Before the case was tried, the defendant filed a Chapter 7 bank-
ruptcy in Utah, and the plaintiff was scheduled as an unsecured creditor.
The plaintiff filed a proof of claim in the defendant's bankruptcy. No
creditor objected to the debtor's discharge (or for that matter, to the dis-
chargeability of this particular debt) so the debtor/defendant obtained a
discharge in her Utah bankruptcy. 98 The state court case continued to
trial. The trial court awarded the plaintiff the house in controversy, and
the debtor/defendant appealed.
The debtor/defendant first alleged that the state court had no jurisdic-
tion because the suit was nothing more than an attempt to impose a claim
against the debtor, a matter over which the bankruptcy court had exclu-
sive jurisdiction. The court found, however, that the suit was not really
one to determine whether the plaintiff had a claim; rather, the state court
action was one to recover property or damages.99 Therefore, the court of
appeals refused to hold that the state court lacked jurisdiction.
That said, the court found that because a part of the claim involved an
attempt to impose personal liability, the discharge effectively barred the
recovery. 100 This was clearly the correct result; however, the court
reached its conclusion only after a tortured and unnecessary analysis. In
short, this was a claim for fraud, which should have been asserted in the
bankruptcy court, and dischargeability of the claim could have been liti-
gated under section 523. Additionally, the court did not address whether
continuing to pursue this state court claim after the discharge violated the
post-discharge injunction found at section 524 of the Bankruptcy Code.' 0'
In this writer's view, if the court was correct in finding that the debtor's
discharge barred the claim, then the post-discharge injunction should
have also barred proceeding with the lawsuit itself.
Similarly, the Waco Court of Appeals found in Janis v. Associates
Home Equity Services, Inc.,102 that a suit for a right of recission was effec-
tively an equitable claim that constituted a "debt" discharged by a Chap-
96. Sensitive Care, Inc., 28 S.W.2d at 39 (citing Nautical Landings Marina, Inc. v. First
Nat'l Bank, 791 S.W.2d 293, 296 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied)).
97. 3 S.W.3d 135 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1999, pet. denied).
98. Id. at 136.
99. Id. The court did not explain how a suit for damages is not essentially a "claim"
for bankruptcy purposes.
100. The court noted that although this was a suit to recover property, the plaintiff did
not have a specific lien or mortgage against the house, thus it was in the nature of a mone-
tary claim, and not a purely an in rem proceeding. Id. at 139-40.
101. Section 524 of the Bankruptcy Code bars pursuit of discharged claims following
the entry of a discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(3).
102. 29 S.W.3d 244 (Tex. App. - Waco 2000, pet. granted).
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ter 7 bankruptcy. Accordingly, that court found that certain claims were
discharged and barred by the section 524 post-discharge injunction.10 3
Unfortunately, a closer reading of Janis reveals that this case may fall
under the maxim that "bad facts make bad law." The item on which recis-
sion was sought was a mistakenly delivered release of lien, which was sent
to the debtor/borrower in anticipation of a restructuring of a debt secured
by real property. The release was mistakenly delivered to the borrower,
together with the original note, marked paid. The borrower refused to
acknowledge the mistake, so the lender filed suit seeking a declaratory
judgment acknowledging the mistake and canceling the release of lien.
Shortly thereafter, the borrower filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Al-
though the lender sought relief from the stay to proceed with the state
court case, no written order was entered, and the debtor received a dis-
charge. Therefore, the motion to lift the stay was found to be moot.
After the discharge, Associates filed a new suit seeking no monetary
relief, but rather, a declaratory judgment that the delivery of the note and
release were a mistake and judicial foreclosure of the lien.104
As mentioned, the court of appeals found that the suit for recission was
effectively a "claim," which was discharged. In throwing the baby out
with the bath water, however, the effect of this holding was that the credi-
tor lost what had been a perfected interest in property, which was the
result of what was clearly a mistake from which state law typically grants
relief.10 5 This equitable relief could have been granted on what would
have amounted to an in rem basis, effectively reinstating the lien, without
granting the creditor any monetary relief against the debtor personally.
Arguably, this could have been accomplished without violating the post-
discharge injunction; however, the court of appeals did not see the situa-
tion that way. The net effect of this holding is that the debtor used his
Chapter 7 bankruptcy discharge in an offensive way to become unjustly
enriched as a result of a unilateral mistake by the lender.
Fortunately, as of this writing, the Texas Supreme Court has granted
review in Janis, so this holding could be subject to further disposition.
Assuming that the court of appeals' decision stands, it should be read
narrowly and applied to its unique set of facts.106
103. Id. at 249.
104. Id. at 247.
105. As the Janis court stated, "Recission is an equitable remedy that operates to set
aside a contract that is legally valid but is marred by fraud, mistake, or for some other
reason, the court must set it aside to avoid unjust enrichment." Humphrey v. Camelot Ret.
Cmty., 893 S.W.2d 55, 59 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ); Country Cubbard,
Inc. v. Tex Star Corp., 570 S.W.2d 70, 73 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
106. Other than seeking relief from the stay, the opinion did not indicate what other
procedures, if any, the lender attempted either pre- or post-petition. For example, it is
unclear whether a notice of lis pendens was on record as of the bankruptcy or whether the
creditor attempted to remove the state court case to bankruptcy court.
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C. OTHER IMPLICATIONS OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY
1. Cases Filed by the Debtor
It is well settled that the automatic stay of section 362 forbids the com-
mencement of or continuation of action against the debtor. What about
cases filed by the debtor, and against another party? In Montgomery
Ward & Co., Inc. v. Denton County Appraisal District,10 7 Montgomery
Ward filed suit in state court to compel a reassessment of its personal
property for ad valorem tax purposes. While that suit was pending, Mont-
gomery Ward sought relief under Chapter 11. While the Chapter 11 was
pending, the state court case was dismissed for lack of prosecution. Mont-
gomery Ward appealed on two grounds: whether the dismissal order vio-
lated the automatic stay and whether, under non-bankruptcy procedural
grounds, the dismissal deprived Montgomery Ward of due process. 10 8
Quite simply, the court found that the language of section 362 pre-
cludes only suits against the debtor, and it does not have any application
to claims filed by the debtor. Thus, the tax dispute initiated by the debtor
was not stayed. Because it was not stayed, the debtor apparently had the
obligation to pursue the case under applicable state law and procedure.
Therefore, the case was subject to dismissal for want of prosecution. 0 9
2. Suits Against Multiple Defendants, One of Whom is a Debtor
In an opinion that as of this writing was unpublished, the Texas Su-
preme Court addressed the issue of the effect of the automatic stay on
multi-party cases when one, but not all defendants are in bankruptcy. In
In re Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.," 0 the Texas Supreme Court pre-
liminarily found that an order transferring venue, entered while one of a
number of defendants was in bankruptcy, was valid as to all of the non-
debtor defendants."' Presumably, the court was referring to Chapter 7
and Chapter 11 cases, and not Chapter 13, which provides a co-debtor
stay with respect to certain consumer debts. Assuming this opinion
stands, the court also addressed a point, which often causes confusion in
multi-party state court cases. Specifically, the court recognized numerous
holdings that "an express severance is not required for the proceedings to
107. 13 S.W.3d 828 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 2000, pet. denied).
108. The state court found that the dismissal did not violate the debtor's due process
rights, because although the debtor arguably did not receive advance notice of the court's
intent to dismiss, the debtor acknowledged having received the order, or at least having
had actual notice of the dismissal within the time to file a motion to reinstate. Thus, the
appellate court disposed of the due process argument.
109. Id. at 829-30. This case is apparently consistent with an earlier holding of the Fifth
Circuit. See McMillan v. Mbank Ft. Worth, N.A., 4 F.3d 362, 366 (5th Cir. 1993).
110. 35 S.W.3d 602 (Tex. 2000).
111. Id. at 603. According to the Texas Supreme Court: "When a defendant files a
bankruptcy petition, an automatic stay goes into effect and abates any judicial proceeding
against that party." See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). However, the stay only operates against the
debtor, and does not operate against non-debtors or even co-debtors, co-tortfeasors, or co-
defendants.
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continue against the co-debtor. 112 In a state law context, the net effect of
the holding was that the order transferring venue was valid as to the non-
debtor party, and a subsequent order entered by the court purporting to
set that order aside was void because the trial court had lost jurisdiction
as to the non-debtor parties. In the bankruptcy context, the supreme
court found that as to the debtor, the prior order was void and not
voidable. 113
3. Voluntary Dismissal or Non-Suit Affected By Automatic Stay?
In Darr v. Altman,1 4 the 14th Court of Appeals addressed the issue of
whether the voluntary dismissal of or non-suit of a suit against a bank-
ruptcy debtor violates the automatic stay. Apparently, according to that
court, the majority rule in the Texas courts is that it does not.'1 5 The court
accordingly found that a dismissal of a bankruptcy debtor was not void,
but rather a final, appealable judgment.' 6 The reader is cautioned, how-
ever, that not all courts are in agreement on this issue, perhaps even the
Fifth Circuit.117
V. OTHER CREDITORS' RIGHTS CASES
A. PROPER DEFAULT JUDGMENT PROCEDURE
The procedure for obtaining a default judgment in a suit on a note is
quite simple; however, a recent case out of the Amarillo Court of Ap-
peals indicates that there are no shortcuts. In Arenivar v. Providian Na-
tional Bank," 8 the creditor filed suit on a note. The petition contained
general allegations that the debt was not paid as agreed, and it even al-
leged a specific amount of principal plus unpaid interest. The plaintiff did
not, however, attach copies of the note or any other agreement to the
petition." 9 The creditor apparently forwarded to the court coordinator a
motion for entry of a default judgment, together with "supporting docu-
112. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d at 603.
113. Id. at 603.
114. 20 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
115. Id. at 807 (citing Orion Inv., Inc. v. Dunaway & Assocs., Inc., 760 S.W.2d 371, 374
(Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 1988, writ denied) (non-suit does not violate bankruptcy stay be-
cause it terminates the case against the debtor); Weaver v. Jock, 717 S.W.2d 654, 658 (Tex.
App.-Waco 1986, writ refused n.r.e.) (non-suit does not frustrate bankruptcy stay, which
is to protect debtor against further actions)).
116. Darr, 20 S.W.3d at 807.
117. See Pope v. Manville Forest Prods. Corp., 778 F.2d 238, 239 (5th Cir. 1985) (dismis-
sal constitutes a judicial act, which might be construed as a continuation of a judicial pro-
ceeding); see also Ellis v. Consol. Diesel Elec. Corp., 894 F.2d 371, 372-73 (10th Cir. 1990)
(judgment entered in favor of debtor is still an action taken in violation of the stay, and
therefore void); Sanchez v. Hester, 911 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995,
orig. proceeding).
118. 23 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000, no pet.).
119. Id. at 497.
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mentation. '1120 There was no evidentiary hearing, however, conducted in
connection with the default judgment. The court entered a monetary
judgment based on the debtor's default. 12' The debtor filed a motion for
new trial and on appeal asserted that the trial court erred in failing to
conduct an evidentiary hearing on damages.
Of course, upon a defendant's default, all allegations of fact contained
in the petition are deemed admitted, with the exception of damages. 122
Even with liability established, the issue then becomes whether the
amount of damages are liquidated, which occurs "if the amount of dam-
ages caused by the defendant can be accurately calculated from (1) the
factual, as opposed to conclusory, allegations in the petition, AND (2) an
instrument in writing."'21 3 Crucially, the court noted that a claim can seem
to be liquidated but in actuality be unliquidated because of pleading alle-
gations that actually require proof for resolution. 124
In short, with no documentation attached to the petition, the court
found that the damages were effectively unliquidated. Therefore, it was
error for the court to fail to conduct an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly,
the court affirmed the default judgment as to liability but remanded the
case for an evidentiary hearing on damages and attorneys' fees.12 5
The moral of Arenivar is that one should not take the pleading and
proof requirements for granted, even in a simple suit on a note. Failure to
attach the note or other loan documentation to the petition can prove
fatal in a summary judgment context without an evidentiary hearing. The
better practice is to (a) attach the loan documents to the petition; (b)
plead damages with specificity if anticipating a default judgment without
an evidentiary hearing; and (c) attach the proof necessary to establish
attorneys' fees, which may typically require an evidentiary hearing even if
damages are liquidated. 2 6
B. FEDERAL PREEMPTION-SUITS BY FOREIGN BANKS
In In re Hibernia National Bank,127 an out of state bank filed suit on a
note against a Texas borrower. The borrower filed a plea in abatement,
120. The documentation apparently included an affidavit by an agent of the plaintiff,
which stated the amount due, together with an affidavit of plaintiff's counsel regarding the
reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. (citing Tex. Commerce Bank, N.A. v. New, 3 S.W.3d 515, 516-17 (Tex. 1999)).
123. Id. (citing Pentes Design, Inc. v. Perez, 84 S.W.2d 75, 79 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1992, writ denied) (emphasis added)).
124. Arenivar v. Providian Nat'l Bank, 23 S.W.3d 496, 498 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000,
no pet.).
125. Id.
126. Most notes provide for recovery of "reasonable" attorneys' fees, which would re-
quire expert testimony. A court may also take judicial notice of reasonable attorneys' fees,
which was apparently not invoked in Arevenar. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 38.004 (Vernon 2000) (court may take judicial notice of usual and customary attorneys'
fees).
127. 21 S.W.3d 908 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.).
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which was granted by the trial court. This matter was brought to the ap-
pellate court by a writ of mandamus.
The debtor's efforts to fend off the case because of the bank's foreign
status were unsuccessful for two reasons. First, very specific federal law
provides that national banks have power "to sue and be sued, complain
and defend, in any court of law or equity, as fully as natural persons."'1 28
Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has previously indicated
that national banks "are subject to state laws, unless those laws infringe
the national banking laws or impose an undue burden on the performance
of the bank's functions."1 29 Accordingly, the court of appeals found that
as to foreign national banks, the statutory provision quoted above effec-
tively preempted any state law prohibiting foreign corporations from do-
ing business in Texas. 130
Additionally, the court may not have even had to rely on the federal
preemption, because the Texas Business Corporation Act specifically ex-
cludes most actions to collect debts from the concept of "transacting busi-
ness" in Texas. Specifically, in its laundry list of exceptions from the
definition of "transacting business," the action of "securing or collecting
debts due ... or enforcing any rights in property securing the same," does
not constitute transacting business.131 Thus, the mandamus was issued,
and the foreign bank was properly allowed to continue its suit to collect
the debt.
C. DEED OF TRUST FORECLOSURE
1. Oral Announcement of "Sold" Means Sold
In Key v. Pierce,32 a substitute trustee bid $55,068, apparently as a
credit bid on behalf of the lender. Pierce, a real estate investor, bid
$55,069. The bid was accepted by the trustee, and Pierce was given thirty
minutes to return with the money. While Pierce was gone, the trustee was
told (incorrectly) that the mortgagors had filed bankruptcy. When Pierce
returned with a cashier's check in the correct amount, the trustee refused
to accept the money because of the apparent bankruptcy filing by the
mortgagors. Ultimately, it was discovered that the mortgagors had not
filed bankruptcy.
Apparently, the property was reposted for sale the following month. At
that sale, Pierce re-tendered his $55,069 to the trustee, but the trustee had
128. Id. at 909 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 24 (West 1989)).
129. Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 248 (1944) (emphasis added).
130. Texas courts are generally bound by the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution, which makes federal statutes the law in every state and enforceable in state
courts. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 2255 (1999). This was recognized in
Janis v. Assocs. Home Equity Servs., Inc., 29 S.W.3d 244, 247 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, pet.
granted).
131. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, 21 S.W.3d at 910 (citing TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
8.01B(8) (Vernon Supp. 2000)). On this issue, this was not a case of first impression. See
Paskett v. FDIC, 785 S.W.2d 172, 173 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ dism'd
w.o.j.).
132. 8 S.W.3d 704 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 1999, pet. denied).
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been authorized to substantially outbid Pierce. The lender was an-
nounced as the high bidder at this second sale. The lender was deeded the
property and subsequently sold it to an unrelated third party, who moved
into the property and designated it as their homestead.
Pierce filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment to the effect that he
was the successful bidder, and therefore equitable owner of the prop-
erty.133 The defendants defended based on the statute of frauds.
The dispositive issue regarding ownership of the property was the trus-
tee's misplaced reliance on the statute of frauds in the context of the trus-
tee's sale, which concluded at the trustee's announcement of "sold." In
short, the trial court found, and the appellate court affirmed, that the
notice of sale, read together with the underlying deed of trust, provided a
sufficient written memorandum of the terms of the sale, especially when
considered in connection with the tendered check. Effectively, the sale
was complete as of the announcement, and the existing documents (the
deed of trust and notice of sale) provided sufficient writings reflecting the
essential terms of the sale. 134 Accordingly, Pierce was granted summary
judgment, and the subsequent deeds executed at the second sale and on
subsequent disposition by the lender were declared void. 135
D. LIEN PRIORITIES-MOTOR VEHICLE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE
In Bank One Texas, N.A. v. Arcadia Financial, Ltd.,136 an automobile
dealer's floor plan lender sought declaratory judgment that its security
interest in the dealer's inventory was not cut off by subsequent sales of
the vehicles without title transfers. Bank One, the inventory lender, had a
perfected security interest in the dealer's inventory, and it also took phys-
ical possession of certificates of title. Nine persons apparently bought ve-
hicles, purportedly in the ordinary course of business, financed by
Arcadia Financial. The dealer, however, did not transfer the certificates
of title to the buyers. 137
The district court found, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, that Arcadia, as
the purported purchase money lender for the vehicle buyers, was on no-
tice of Bank One's security interest because Bank One's inventory fi-
nancing statements were apparently filed with the secretary of state. 138
Even though the alleged buyers were given physical possession of the
vehicles, the sales were not complete nor in the ordinary course of busi-
ness because the transfer of the certificates of title never took place. Spe-
133. Pierce also sought damages under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("DTPA")
and a constructive trust based on fraud and unconscionable conduct.
134. Id. at 708. Again, note that the initial claim was for a declaratory judgment and not
for breach of contract, which may have had an impact on the context in which the statute
of frauds really applied.
135. Id. at 707-08.
136. 219 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 2000). This was a diversity case, so the Fifth Circuit applied
Texas law. Id. at 498 n.4 (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
137. The certificates of title remained in Bank One's possession.
138. Id. at 497.
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cifically, the Certificate of Title Act provides that a sale does not occur
"unless the owner designated in the certificate of title transfers the certifi-
cate of title at the time of the sale."1 39 Crucially, a footnote to the Fifth
Circuit opinion provides that even though the Certificate of Title Act de-
fers to Article 9, earlier Texas opinions found that requiring a certificate
transfer in order to complete a sale does not conflict with Article 9.140
Because a sale never effectively occurred, the buyers acquired no real
interest in the vehicles, and they could not grant Arcadia a security
interest.141
E. NOTE PURCHASERS AND ASSIGNEES
1. Guaranty Agreements
Two cases from the Survey period are indicative of the assignability of
the original rights of a payee of a note and/or the beneficiary of a guar-
anty agreement. First, in Boyd v. Diversified Financial Systems,'142 the
purchaser of a note from the FDIC brought suit on a guaranty agreement.
Specifically, the FDIC was appointed receiver of a failed bank, and ap-
proximately four years after the insolvency, the FDIC sold the note and
any "collateral documents" which included in the assignment any guaran-
ties, to the note purchaser. The note was endorsed by the FDIC, in its
corporate capacity to the purchaser. 143 Factually, the guarantor admitted
signing the note and the guaranty agreement.
The debtor asserted numerous defenses and attempts to avoid liability,
including an assertion that copies of the note and guaranty (which he had
admitted signing) were inadmissible as hearsay. The court found, how-
ever, that the copies were admissible. This was distinguished from an ear-
lier opinion on which the guarantor relied, which excluded certain
summary documents (and not copies of the actual documents themselves)
as hearsay. 144 The guarantor also claimed that the plaintiff was not the
holder of the note, because the endorsement came from FDIC corporate
rather than FDIC as receiver for the failed bank. The court also disposed
of this question based on existing Fifth Circuit authority, the effect of
which was that "the FDIC was without question the holder of the
note.' 45 The guarantor even claimed, unsuccessfully, that the plaintiff
was not the holder of the underlying note because it did not have actual
139. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 501.071(a) (Vernon 1999).
140. Arcadia, 219 F.3d at 497 n.3. See also Pfluger, 620 S.W.2d 739, 741 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e).
141. Arcadia, 219 F.3d at 498. "A third party's perfected security interest is not inter-
rupted when a purported buyer attempts to purchase an automobile without receiving title
as required to complete a sale under the Certificate of Title Act." Id.
142. 1 S.W.3d 888 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.).
143. Id. at 890.
144. Id. at 891 (distinguishing Sholdra v. Bluebonnet Sav. Bank, 858 S.W.2d 533 (Tex.
App.-Ft. Worth 1993, writ denied)).
145. Id. at 892 (citing FDIC v. Patel, 46 F.3d 482 (5th Cir. 1995)).
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possession. Rather, possession was kept in a vault of one of the plaintiff's
investors.
Regarding the guaranty itself, the guarantor argued that the plaintiff
was not the actual owner of the guaranty, relying on an earlier case out of
the Dallas court. That earlier case was distinguishable because the origi-
nal guaranty in Boyd was clearly in existence and had been assigned by
the FDIC.146 Finally, the guarantor asserted what amounted to an "im-
pairment of collateral" defense, based on an alleged failure to perfect a
security interest that would have secured the underlying debt. The court
found, however, that the debtor specifically waived this defense in the
guaranty agreement, which waiver was enforceable. 147 Similarly, in Cadle
Co. v. Regency Homes, Inc.,148 the debtor and guarantor took a similar
tack in response to suit filed by another note purchaser based on a prom-
issory note and guaranty agreement acquired from an assignee of the
FDIC. Essentially, these debtors' defenses included claims of payment,
the lack of a verifiable interest rate due to the failure of the original bank,
and the failure to dispose of collateral in a commercially reasonable man-
ner. The debtors managed to convince the trial court; however, the case
was reversed and remanded.
The court of appeals recited the basic requirements for recovery on a
note.149 The court next acknowledged the difficulty of establishing inter-
est when the rate is variable, and the index is tied to the prime rate of a
failed bank. The court of appeals disposed of the payment claims, finding
that the evidence in the trial court was legally and factually sufficient to
support the debtor's affirmative defense. The court of appeals also dis-
posed of the variable interest claims, citing case law and statutory devel-
opments that in effect modernized the UCC and maintained the ability to
preserve the negotiability of variable interest rate notes. 150 Specifically,
courts may substitute a reasonable rate of interest, and in Regency
146. Id. at 893 (distinguishing Ashcraft v. Lookadoo, 952 S.W.2d 907, 913-14 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1997), pet. denied per curiam, 977 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. 1998)).
147. Id. at 893-94. Texas courts have routinely upheld waivers in guaranty agreements.
For example, in Wiman v. Tomaszewicz, 877 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, no writ),
a court of appeals held that a guarantor was not released from guaranty liability after
renewal of a note, even in light of a $6,000 renewal fee having been added to the debt. The
guaranty agreement provided that the note could be extended, renewed, or modified with-
out the guarantor's notice or consent. Similarly, in Mann v. NCNB Texas National Bank,
854 S.W.2d 664, 667 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ), a guarantor remained liable for
non-payment of a loan despite his lack of consent to a number of loan extensions where
the guaranty agreement unambiguously waived such notice. Likewise, in Lawyer's Title
Insurance Corp. v. Northeast Texas Development Co., 635 S.W.2d 897, 899 (Tex. App.-
Tyler 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the court held that in light of an unambiguous waiver, the
substitution and/or release of underlying collateral would not diminish guaranty liability,
even when collateral is released without notice to the guarantors. See also SEI Bus. Sys.,
Inc. v. Bank One Texas, N.A., 803 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, no writ).
148. 21 S.W.3d 670 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied).
149. "To collect on a promissory note, a plaintiff must establish: (1) the existence of the
note in question, (2) the defendant signed the note, (3) the plaintiff is the owner and holder
of the note, and (4) a certain balance is due and owing on the note." Id. at 674.
150. See Amberboy v. Societe de Banque Privee, 831 S.W.2d 793, 797 (Tex. 1992)
(funding a variable rate note is a negotiable instrument).
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Homes, the trial court's failure to imply such a reasonable rate of interest
was reversible error.151
Regarding the guaranty, the guarantor also relied (unsuccessfully) on
the same Dallas Court of Appeals opinion distinguished in Boyd. Specifi-
cally, the court of appeals found that the Cadle Company possessed the
original guaranty, which was introduced into evidence without objection,
and the guarantor also admitted acknowledging the guaranty. The
purchase agreement governing the assignment of the notes to Cadle also
included in its definition of "collateral documents" personal guaranties,
corporate guaranties, etc.152 The court found, based in part on the Boyd
opinion discussed above, that there was no need to imply a transfer of a
guaranty, but rather the transfer was established. Therefore, the Cadle
Company owned the guaranty and could enforce it according to its
terms.1
53
Neither Boyd nor Regency Homes necessarily presents a significant
change in the law; however, they are both indicative of the potential pit-
falls faced by note buyers and successor banks. The bottom line, however,
is that assignees and endorsees will typically recover on promissory notes
and underlying guaranty agreements if the terms of the original docu-
ments are proven up, and particularly if transfer of the ownership of the
guaranty can be established. Guaranty agreements will typically be en-
forced according to their express terms, and payment is an affirmative
defense that must be established by the payor/debtor/guarantor.
2. Statutes of Limitations-Subsequent Assignees of FDIC
In an appeal of yet another attempt to avoid liability on an assigned
note, the Eastland Court of Appeals followed Boyd in disposing of
Bosque Asset Corp. v. Greenberg.154 In Greenberg, the borrower appar-
ently managed to convince the trial court that a slight variance between
the name of the payee bank and the name of the bank identified in the
comptroller's declaration of insolvency, together with an endorsement
from FDIC corporate instead of FDIC receiver, was sufficient to avoid
liability on a note. The court of appeals, however, reversed, finding that
the bank identified in the declaration of insolvency was the same as the
payee of the subject note.' 55 Additionally, following Boyd, the court also
found that "it was irrelevant that FDIC corporate endorsed the note,
even though FDIC receiver was the purported owner. The relevant fact
was that the 'FDIC was without question the holder of the note."1 56
151. Regency Homes, Inc., 21 S.W.3d at 679-80. See also Bailey, Vaught, Robertson &
Co. v. Remington Invs., Inc., 888 S.W.2d 860, 866 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, no writ); TEX.
Bus. COMM. CODE ANN. § 3.112(b) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
152. Regency Homes, Inc., 21 S.W.3d at 682.
153. Id. at 683.
154. 19 S.W.3d 514 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2000, pet. denied).
155. Id. at 518.
156. Id. at 519-20 (citing FDIC v. Patel, 46 F.3d 482, 485 (5th Cir. 1995) and Boyd v.
Diversified Fin. Sys., 1 S.W.3d 888, 891-92 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.)).
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In a somewhat new twist on the six year federal statute of limitations,
the borrower argued that even though assignees of the FDIC enjoyed the
federal six year statute of limitations, a subsequent assignment destroyed
that special status. 157 The court found this argument unpersuasive, find-
ing that to the extent the law of assignments applies to the first assignee,
there is no reason to deprive subsequent assignees of the same rights.
Therefore, the six year statute applied to the noteholder in this case, even
though the noteholder was not the direct assignee of the FDIC.158 Finally,
the borrower argued that because the new noteholder intervened more
than six years after the maturity date, its claims were somehow barred,
even though the original petition had been filed by the prior owner well
within the six year limitations. The court of appeals also disposed of this
argument, and the case was reversed. 159
F. ACTUAL DAMAGES UNDER TRUTH IN LENDING ACT
In a case arising out of Louisiana after the Survey period, the Fifth
Circuit recently held that a claimant must show detrimental reliance on a
lender/lessor's disclosure violation to recover actual damages under the
Federal Truth in Lending Act 160 or Consumer Leasing Act.161 Because
Perone v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,162 was issued after the Sur-
vey period and is not yet in the permanent reporter, it will be more thor-
oughly examined in the next Survey issue. 163
157. It has long been held by Texas courts that an assignee of the FDIC enjoys the
benefit of the same federal six year statute of limitations granted the FDIC. Jackson v.
Thweatt, 883 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. 1994).
158. Greenberg, 19 S.W.3d at 521.
159. Id. at 522. The borrower relied on a prior Texas case in which numerous interven-
ers asserted new and different causes of action, which were barred by limitations. In Green-
berg, however, the intervention essentially involved a substitution of parties pursuing the
original claim, which had been timely filed. Compare Russell v. People's Nat'l Bank of
Belton, 2 S.W.2d 961, 962 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1928, writ ref'd) (intervention by new
noteholder asserting same claim does not constitute a new cause of action) with Koch Oil
Co. v. Wilber, 895 S.W.2d 854, 863 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1995, writ denied) (new plain-
tiffs asserting new causes of action does not relate back to original filing). Both of these
cases were cited in Greenberg.
160. 15 U.S.C. § 1601.
161. 15 U.S.C. § 1667.
162. 232 F.3d 433 (2000).
163. The court found that under the plain meaning of these statutes, detrimental reli-
ance was an element of the plaintiff's claim with respect to actual damages. Apparently,
this holding did not apply to statutory liquidated damages, regarding which the statute has
no similar provision. Id. at 440.
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